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THE PATHOLOGY OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA*
SYDNEY KENTRIDGE t

A surprisingly large number of American lawyers visit South
Africa or follow closely what is happening in that country. Their
fascination with the legal institutions of a small and distant country,
whose common law is the Roman-Dutch law, has often struck me
as remarkable. I do not complain of it, as one of its agreeable consequences (from my point of view, at least) is that I have been invited to give this lecture. Part of the explanation, no doubt, is
that the courts in South Africa deal with laws and institutions that
bear an uncomfortably close resemblance to those with which American courts had to deal in the fairly recent past-laws and institutions
that permit or even ordain discrimination on grounds of race and
colour. Perhaps a more profound reason for American attention
to South Africa is that South Africa exemplifies in the most intense
form what is possibly the major international issue of the second
half of the twentieth century-namely, the correlation between skin
colour and enjoyment of political power, civil liberty, and economic
affluence. Attention is focused on South Africa not because it has
quantitatively less freedom, less justice, or less democratic government than a hundred other countries one could name. Those goods
do exist in South Africa, but they are strictly rationed on the sole
basis of colour-not on citizenship or birth or merit, but colour
alone. Discrimination on the ground of colour in South Africa
is not an aberration to be deprecated and remedied, but an institution that is authorised and, frequently, actually commanded by
statute. That is the essential difference from the discrimination
that undoubtedly continues to be found in the United States, in
England, or in New Zealand. It is not discrimination but integration that is expressly forbidden by the Parliament of South Africa.
At the time when Brown v. Board of Education1 was before
the United States Supreme Court, and the doctrine of "separate but
equal" was on the point of disappearing from American jurisprudence, the same doctrine, which had been blessed twenty years
* This Article is based on the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, delivered
18 October 1979, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of
the Coif, the Law Alumni Society, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
f Senior Counsel, Johannesburg Bar; Barrister at Law, Lincoln's Inn. B.A.
1941, University of the Witwatersrand; B.A. 1948, M.A. 1953, Oxford University.
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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earlier by South Africa's highest court,2 was also disappearing from
South African law. It was, however, disappearing in a different
direction. A short statute, known as the Reservation of Separate
Amenities Act, 1953,3 simply and clearly provided not merely that
public premises or public vehicles would be set apart or reserved
for the exclusive use of persons belonging to a particular race or
class,4 but also that any such setting apart or reservation would not
be invalid on the ground that the premises or vehicles reserved for
the use of one class were not equal to those reserved for any other
race or class.5
Another aspect of the South African system makes it a particular subject of interested observation by lawyers in Western countries.
Notwithstanding statutes such as that I have just mentioned, and
notwithstanding the increasingly authoritarian tone of government
in South Africa, the traditional forms of legal process have not been
abandoned. Trials, including trials of enemies or critics of the
government (two categories which those in high levels of government often have difficulty distinguishing), take place in ordinary
courts, open to the press and usually to the public, before the
ordinary judges of the land. The accused are entitled to be defended by counsel, and there are always counsel willing to defend
them. For many years (and for good reasons into which I need not
enter here), we have had no jury trials in South Africa. The judge
himself is the trier of fact. Save for this feature, however, a criminal trial in South Africa, up to very recent times at least, was
conducted subject to those rules of evidence and procedure that,
with the English language and the game of cricket, have been the
most beneficent and lasting legacies of the British Empire.
But in very recent times, under the stress of sharpened conflict
between the rulers and the ruled that has gone hand in hand with
the increasingly authoritarian tone of government to which I have
referred, we have witnessed-or, some of us, experienced-a profound
distortion of our traditional legal system. A distortion, but not a
disappearance. So there is something to be observed, by ourselves
as South African lawyers, as well as by foreign lawyers who have a
fundamentally similar conception of what constitutes a fair trial:
the pathology of a system of criminal justice. This applies largely,
although not entirely, to political trials, that is, prosecutions for
2 Minister of Posts & Telegraphs v. Rasool, [1934] App. Div. [A.D.] 167.
3Act No. 49 of 1953.
4Id. § 2.

5Id. § 3(b).
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political offences. It is this pathological condition to which I shall
devote most of this lecture. I shall describe it, attempt to define the
"philosophy" underlying this departure from previously accepted.
norms of proper judicial process, and finally say a word about those
who participate in it, both judges and lawyers.
There are two preliminary observations to be made. First,
by reason of the similarity between the American system and the
South African system, one may take this to be an implicit exercise
in comparative criminal procedure. Comparative studies, especially
in this field, tend to contain a strong moral element, sometimes
disquieting but to American lawyers, no doubt, usually satisfying.
The procedural novelties-to use a neutral term-that I shall describe have been created not by the judges, but by a sovereign legislature that is unfettered by any such eighteenth-century institution
as a bill of rights. Americans may understandably take comfort in
the fact that their Constitution, as presently interpreted, does not
permit such things to happen. In many Western countries, including the United States, however, there are persons in powerful positions who maintain that existing forms of criminal procedure are
weighted too heavily in favour of the accused, and that politically
motivated crimes in particular call for special forms of procedure
making it easier to obtain convictions. An examination of what
may happen to a legal system when these views prevail may therefore be of some general interest.
The second preliminary observation to be made concerns the
legitimacy of the criticism of the South African system of political
trials. The South African government justifies its security legislation, including those criminal procedure statutes to which I shall
refer, on the ground that South Africa faces a serious threat of subversion from within and outside its borders. The existence of this
threat may be fully accepted. Persons charged with political offences in South Africa have often been shown to have been engaged
in activities that in any country would be regarded as criminal,
activities involving actual or potential violence against the state.
The question remains, however, whether this undeniable fact justifies the forms of procedure under which those charged with such
offences are now tried.
Further, much as the South African government resents criticisms of its laws and practices, it has in a sense invited them. For
the South African government firmly maintains that it is a part of
the free world and that it is indeed the main, if not the sole, representative in Africa of Western civilization. The distinguished and
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perceptive judge in whose honour this lecture is presented, in a
celebrated address given at Oxford, referred to the rule of law as an
idea recognised by what he called "highly civilised nations." Asked
what countries he would include in this category, Mr. Justice
Roberts replied: "'My test would be, first, a country that has a
representative form of government; second, a country where individual liberty and freedom are protected by law; [and third],
where there are bounds and limits to what the government can do
to an individual.' "6 As a South African lawyer, that is the criterion
by which I would want my legal system to be judged. I am not
impressed when I am told that things are done worse in the USSR
or Uganda or, for that matter, in the Comoro Islands. In South
Africa we are the inheritors of two of the great legal systems of the
world, the Roman-Dutch law of Holland and the common law of
England. We should invite and accept judgment by the standards
of those systems.
I.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. The TraditionalStandards
In order to understand the pathology of a body, one must
know something of its normal functions. It is not necessary for me
to describe at length the normal rules of South African criminal
procedure, as most of its features will be exceedingly familiar. First,
the rules relating to arrest, with or without warrant, are similar in
general to those of American law. The arrested person has the
right to remain silent and must be warned by the police that he
has this right before he is interrogated. He has a right to consult a
legal adviser immediately after he has been arrested. He must be
brought before a court within forty-eight hours of his arrest. He
may apply for bail. Even before the process in court commences,
he has (or had in the past) the broad protection of the writ of habeas
corpus, or its Roman-Dutch equivalent, the writ de homine libero
exhibendo3 His trial is an adversary proceeding in which he is
6 Discussion by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts at Oxford following his lecture,
The Rule of Law in the International Community (Nov., 1951), quoted in Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. Pa. L. REv. 943, 943
(1958).
7 See 6 J. VoET, Tna SELT VE VoET, BEING TE COMMJENTARY ON TM
PANDEcTs 528-29 (P. Cane trans. 1957); Kentridge, Habeas Corpus Procedure in
South Africa, 79 S.Aea. L.J. 283, 285 (1962).
In the Roman-Dutch law the approach to this writ is entirely without technicality. As stated by one South African judge, the rule is simply that every arrest
is prima facie unlawful and must be justified in court by the arresting authority if
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protected by the privilege against self-incrimination and in which
the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. He has the right
to counsel of his choice (subject, admittedly, to paying the going
fee or to finding someone else willing to pay it) and, in general, the
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The rule
against hearsay evidence applies with full, some would even say
outmoded, rigour. And no confession is admissible against him that
was not in all respects freely and voluntarily made.
Of course, as in all systems, these rules have not always been
observed. Confessions made under physical or mental duress do
slip past judicial scrutiny; often the requisite police warning of the
right to be silent is not given; various statutes alter the burden of
proof; the accused cannot always afford counsel, especially the black
accused who, in an average year, constitute ninety per cent of all
criminal defendants.8 Nonetheless, these rules, some statutory and
some judge-made, have set a standard of due process, the standard
by which the fairness of a trial ought to be judged.
The time has now come to examine to what extent these standards still apply in South Africa to trials for political offences. I do
not pause to define minutely what is meant by a political offence.
It has sometimes been disputed in South Africa, as it has elsewhere,
whether such offences exist. It is enough to say that I am referring
to crimes committed with the political motive of altering or protesting against the current political dispensation.
South Africa has had an interesting-some would say an overinteresting-history of political turbulence, which has been marked
by many series of political trials, including trials for high treason.
During the Anglo-Boer War, many Boers living in the British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal assisted the Boer forces;
in 1914 some thousands of diehard veterans of the Anglo-Boer War
went into rebellion against the government of what was then the
Union of South Africa; in 1922 there was a revolt of white workers
on the Witwatersrand; and from 1939 to 1945 a number of Afrikaner
nationalists acted in support of the. German cause. All these events
resulted in trials for treason. In 1958, thirty leaders of the African
National Congress and its political allies were charged with concalled upon to do so. Principal Immigration Officer v. Narayansamy, [1916]
Transvaal Provincial Div. [T.P.D.] 274, 276 (quoting the unreported opinion of
Wessels, J., in the court below). See also the powerful opinion of Rumpff, C.J., in
Wood v. Ondangwa Tribal Auth., [1975] 2 S.A. 294, 310-11 (App. Div.), in which
the Appellate Division (South Africa's final appeals court) reemphasised that the

remedy should be construed as broadly as possible.
8
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spiracy to overthrow the state by violence. The charge there too was
treason. This trial differed in an important respect from previous
South African treason trials in that most of the accused were black.
After a trial which lasted from August, 1958, to March, 1961, all
the accused were acquitted. 9 All these trials were conducted according to the normal rules of South African criminal procedure. Indeed, when the charge was treason, the prosecution had the added
burden of complying with a provision that, up to 1977, had always
been embodied in the South African Criminal Procedure Acts. 10
These Acts provided that no court would "convict any accused of
treason except upon the evidence of two witnesses where one overt
act is charged, or where two or more overt acts are so charged, upon
the evidence of one witness to each such overt act." '1
B. The Terrorism Act
Possibly because of the highly publicised failure of the prosecution in the treason trial of 1958 to 1961, possibly influenced also
by the happenings at Sharpeville in 1960 12 as well as by disturbances
in the Cape in 1962,13 the South African government adopted a new
approach to the prosecution of political offenders. After experimenting with amendments to various other statutes-all designed to
facilitate the prosecution and conviction of persons alleged to be
carrying on subversive activities against the state-the government,
in 1967, put through Parliament an Act that introduced, under the
name of "terroristic activities" or "terrorism," a new form of statutory treason.' 4 According to this Act, a person is guilty of the
9 The record of this trial is analyzed in T. KAS, Tim Tax.sor TrarL n
(1965).
lOE.g., Criminal Procedure Act, No. 56 of 1955, §256(b), repealed by
Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977, § 208.
11 Id. This provision was first enacted in England in the reign of William I
in the Statute of Treasons of 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 2. It was repealed in
England by the Treason Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 44, § 2, sched. 1, and in South
Africa by Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977, § 208. It is embodied in U.S.
CONsT. art. 3, § 3, cl. 1. For a further discussion of this provision, see text
accompanying notes 34-40 infra.
12 On March 21, 1960, a crowd of some thousands of blacks gathered at the
police station in Sharpeville (about 30 miles south of Johannesburg) to protest
against the pass laws. The police fired on the crowd. Sixty-nine blacks were
killed, and 180 were wounded.
13 On 21st November 1972 in Paarl, a small town near Cape Town, a rioting
black mob killed two whites and seriously injured three others. They also set fire
to shops.
14Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967. For a thorough, perceptive, and authoritative account of this Act and of other South African security laws generally, see
J. DuGAiw, HumAN BiGorrs AND THE SoUTH AmuCAN LEGAL ORnEI 250-365 (1978).
SOUTH AmUCA
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offence of participating in terroristic activities if he commits any
act whatsoever with the intention of endangering the maintenance
of law and order in the Republic of South Africa.15 Upon conviction he is liable to the penalties appropriate to common law treason,
including the death penalty, and subject to a minimum sentence of
five years' imprisonment, which may not be suspended.1 6
This Act is a considerable extension of the concept of treason.
In the Roman-Dutch law, the crime of treason is limited to acts
committed with the intention of overthrowing the state by violence.
That element is not essential under the Terrorism Act. On the
contrary, the Act, with the aid of presumptions that transfer the
burden of proof to the accused,17 covers a range of offences going
well beyond what would ordinarily be regarded as terrorism or
treason. For example, the Act prohibits activities that are likely "to
cause substantial financial loss to any person or the State." 18 Thus,
if it is proved that the accused organised a strike or an economic
boycott that was likely to result in such loss, then, unless he can
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that was not his intent, he
must be found guilty of terrorism.
The Act's practical effect is greatly extended by the inclusion
of a second class of actions that would not ordinarily be regarded as
treasonable, namely, actions calculated to create feelings of hostility
between the white and black inhabitants of the country.' 9 An actual
case illustrates the operation of this provision. A young black man
wrote a violently anti-white poem. He showed it to only one person,
a seventeen-year-old girl. The publication of the poem to this
girl was found to have had the likely result of causing her to feel
hostile towards whites. The accused could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he did not intend her to have such feelings. He
-was consequently convicted of terrrorism and sentenced to five years'
20
imprisonment.
The Act contains many procedural provisions designed to
assist the prosecution. The rule against documentary hearsay evidence is modified in favour of the state by an extraordinary, but
much used, provision.2 ' No court is permitted to grant bail to a
15 Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, § 2(1).
16 Id.

§2(2).
181d. §2(2)(h).
'9ld. § 2(2)(i).
'7Id.

20 State v. Motsau (Witwatersrand Local Div. Apr., 1974) (unreported).
21 See Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, § 2(3). Under this provision, the prosecutor

-may produce, not through a witness but from his own file, any document that on
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person charged under the Act without the consent of the attorneygeneral.m Acquittal does not preclude subsequent arraignment
on another charge arising out of the same conduct.2 3 Perhaps most
remarkable, this statute became law on 12th June 1967, but its,
substantive, procedural, and evidentiary provisions are all deemed
to have come into effect in June, 1962.24 That is to say, the Act
was made to apply retrospectively to a time five years before it was
enacted. In one leading case, the accused had actually been arrested
and in custody for about a year before the Terrorism Act was passed;
they were nonetheless charged and convicted under that Act. 25
These provisions do not in themselves explain the actual working of the Terrorism Act. The key to its practical operation is to
be found in section 6. This section permits the police, without
judicial warrant, to detain any person who any senior police officer
has reason to believe either committed an offence under the Act or
has any knowledge of such an offence.2 6 The object of the detention
is interrogation, and the detention may continue either until the
detainee has answered all questions put to him to the satisfaction
of the police or until the police are convinced that "no useful purpose will be served by his further detention" 27-a phrase with
chilling implications. It is also expressly provided that no court
of law may pronounce upon the validity of a detention under section 6, nor order the release of a detainee.28 Further, no person
may have access to a detainee,2 9 that is, he is held incommunicado.
He may not see or even communicate by letter with a lawyer, a
private doctor, or a member of his family. Habeas corpus is not
permitted.3 0 The Act does not authorise physical ill-treatment of
detainees, 31 and indeed assault and torture as a means of interrogaits face emanated from any organization of which the accused was at any time a
member. The document is admissible against the accused, and its contents are
prima facie presumed to be true. See, e.g., State v. Malepane, [1979] 1 S.A. 1009,
1015 (Witwatersrand Local Div.) (per Le Roux, J.).
22
Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, § 5(f).

23Id. § 5(h).
24

1d. § 9(1).
25 State v. Tuhadeleni, [19691 1 S.A. 153 (App. Div.).
26 Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, § 6(1).
27 Id.

281d. § 6(5).
29Id. § 6(6).
30 Id. § 6(5).
3

1 Nxasana v. Minister of Justice, [1976] 3 S.A. 745, 748 (Durban & Coast
Local Div.) (per Didcott, J.). Cf. Rossouw v. Sachs, [1964] 2 S.A. 551, 561 (App.
Div.) (decided under § 17 of the General Law Amendment Act, No. 37 of 1963?
an earlier detention statute).
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tion have been officially disavowed by the South African government and by senior police officers. The official attitude is that the
only sanction available against a recalcitrant detainee is his continued indefinite detention in solitary confinement, without books,
2
letters, newspapers, or any communication with the outside world.
In any country, however, if detained persons have no access to
lawyers or to the courts, abuses are bound to occur-as they undoubtedly have in South Africa.
Section 6 detention has a profound effect on the conduct of
trials under the Terrorism Act. First, the accused himself will
probably have been detained in solitary confinement for weeks,
months, or sometimes even years before he is brought to trial.
Unless he is a person of extraordinary fortitude, he will probably
have made a statement to the police, often in the form of a confession, whether false or true. He is unlikely to understand the rules
relating to the admissibility in evidence of his statement. In a
disquieting recent development, the police have brought some detainees straight from weeks or months of detention to a court without giving notice to their friends and families. The detainees have
then and there been called upon to plead to a complex charge under
the Terrorism Act, without the benefit of legal advice or representation. Only after they have pleaded are they able to obtain representation by counsel. Consequently, persons have pleaded guilty
to serious charges under this Act without the benefit of legal advice.
Perhaps equally important, many of the prosecution witnesses in
these trials are persons who have been subjected to prolonged detention in solitary confinement under section 6. Often they too are
brought straight from detention to court to give evidence. They
will usually have made statements implicating the accused. These
statements may be true, but even if they are not, the witness knows
that if he retracts, the result may well be either his further detention under section 6 or a charge of perjury.
It is therefore understandable that I have referred to the mode
of procedure under this statute as a distortion of South Africa's
traditional system of procedure, or as the pathology of a legal system. What has been altered under this new system for trying
political offences? To list them briefly: the rules restricting arrest
without warrant, the right to be brought before a court speedily
after an arrest, the right to bail, the right to legal representation
immediately upon arrest, in practice the right to silence, the rule
32 See, e.g., 15 S.ArlI IALsAR cols. 7118-7121 (1978) (statement by Mr.
J.T. Kruger, then Minister of Justice, in the House of Assembly in May, 1978).
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that the burden of proof is on the prosecution, the rule against
hearsay evidence, the court's discretion in sentencing, and along
with all of these, the right to habeas corpus. That is to say, a good
part of what people in both the United States and South Africa
have regarded as essential to a fair trial.
The South African government would justify these departures
on the ground that subversion is a real threat in South Africa,
that important information about unlawful activities has been obtained by this system of detention without trial, and that many of
those convicted under the Terrorism Act were in fact engaged in
planning acts of violence against the state. Much of this is true, and
the South African government is no doubt entitled to some credit
for choosing to try political offenders before the ordinary courts
of the land. The reason for this choice may be a residual respect
for the judicial process. Or it may be the belief that imprisonment
after conviction by a criminal court is politically the most persuasive way of disposing of the accused, and the least likely to provoke
internal or international criticism. Either way, the choice is not a
discreditable one.
II.

THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE TERRORISM

Acr

This choice having been made, however, what is the reasoning
behind the new, second-class procedure? It is simply that the more
serious the crime, the easier it should be to convict the accused.
This view has its adherents in all countries. It has often prevailed,
especially in the case of political offenders. And it is an understandable view. As Macaulay wrote, in a trial for treason an acquittal must always be considered a defeat of the government.3 3 But
until recent years, this was not the prevailing philosophy in South
Africa any more than it was in the United States of America. For
political crime, the traditional view was the opposite one.
84
I referred earlier to the two-witness rule in treason cases.
This has always been an exception in the English law of evidence which, unlike Mosaic law 36 or the canon law,3 7 did not require a
33 7 T. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 313 (Westminster ed., n.d.).
3
4 See note 11 supra & accompanying text.
3
5 The only other exception to the English law of evidence in modem times

has been perjury, which has a history of its own.
3
6 Deuteronomy 17:6, 19:15.
37 According to Professor C.S. Kenny of Cambridge, under canon law no cardinal could be convicted of unchastity without at least 12 witnesses, and a woman
could not be a witness. C. KENNY, O TLnEs OF CFIAL LAw 519 n.6 (19th ed.
1966).
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multiplicity of witnesses to prove the commission of a crime. Why
should there be this exception in the case of treason? The seventeenth century in England was a century of revolutions and revolutionary plots. Charles II, restored to the throne in 1660, had good
reason to fear for his security. Yet one of the first acts passed by
the Restoration Parliament was an act requiring proof by two witnesses of certain forms of treason. 3 And in 1695 the Whigs themselves enacted the Statute of Treasons, which reinforced the twowitness rule and provided that persons accused of treason were to be
allowed privileges that they had never before enjoyed, such as the
right to counsel.3 9 This was at a time when the threat of counterrevolution was real and when the only immediate effect of the new law
could be to provide the advantages of a fair trial to the government's
most intransigent opponents. Perhaps those legislators thought
that one day they might again be in opposition. One may nonetheless think that the passage of this law in England in 1695 constituted one of the highest achievements of that Western civilization
of which we in South Africa are said to be amongst the heirs and
guardians.
Why should anyone think that a person charged with treason
required more protection than persons charged with lesser offences?
Sir William Blackstone, writing nearly a century after the Statute
of Treasons was passed, gave a straightforward answer: "[T]he
principal reason undoubtedly is to secure the subject from being
sacrificed to fictitious conspiracies, which have been the engines of
profligate and crafty politicians in all ages." 40
The procedure under the South African Terrorism Act represents a complete reversal of the philosophy behind the Statute of
Treasons. It embodies a feeling, popular in many places and times,
that the more reprehensible an offence is, the easier it ought to be
to obtain a conviction, that enemies of the government should not
be entitled to the ordinary protection of law, but should be placed
at a special disadvantage if accused of a political offence. I do not
believe that today special privileges are necessary, but to subject
the accused to special disabilities and disadvantages is in a measure
to condemn him before he has been tried. The removal of the
presumption of innocence is very close to the assumption of guilt.
38 13 Car. 2, stat. 1, c. 1, § 5 (Treason) (1661).
3

9 Statute of Treasons of 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3.

40 4 W. BLAcKsTONz, ComsmN'rums
33, at 313-14.

* 358. See T.

MACAULAY,

supra note
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One is reminded of the views of that otherwise humane and enlightened French jurist of the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin, on
the crime of witchcraft. He said that persons accused of witchcraft
ought to be convicted without further proof unless they could
demonstrate their innocence. For, he said, "'to adhere, in a trial
for witchcraft, to ordinary rules of procedure, would result in
defeating the law of both God and man.' "41
Have the extraordinary rules worked in South Africa? From
the point of view of the government, the answer is yes. Information has been extracted from detainees that would probably not
have been obtained under the ordinary rules, and persons have
been convicted who might have gone free under ordinary procedures. Whether this is worth the price paid is a question of political
and moral judgment. One's answer will no doubt depend on the
importance one attaches to meeting the criteria for what constitutes
a highly civilised nation, as proposed by Mr. Justice Roberts. 42
A South African judge, referring to section 6 of the Terrorism Act,
said:
In providing for the detention for indefinite periods of
those who have not been convicted of crimes, for their
isolation from legal advice and from their families, and
for their interrogation at the risk of self-incrimination, the
Legislature has pursued its object by the enactment of
measures which are undoubtedly foreign to the ordinary
principles of our law. Whether the end justifies the drastic
means that have been sanctioned because they are necessary
in troubled times for the security of the State, as they are
apparently thought by Parliament to be, is a controversial
question . ... 43
Later in the same judgment he said that effect must be given "to
stringent enactments which are positively shown by Parliament's
choice of plain words to have been meant, however offensive to
conventional legal standards they may be." 44 He described this
conclusion as axiomatic in South African law. On this point he is
undoubtedly correct.
414 J. BODIN, DimONOmANE

ch. 4 (1598), quoted in C.

KENNY,

supra note

37, at 517-18.
42

See text accompanying note 6 supra.

43

Nxasana v. Minister of Justice, [1976] 3 S.A. 745, 747 (Durban & Coast

Local Div.) (per Didcott, J.) (citation omitted).
44

Id. 748.
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III. Tim ATTITUDE OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS
This brings me to the last part of this lecture, the approach
of the judges and lawyers to legislation of this type. South Africa
has, as I have said, no bill of rights. Our political system is one
of complete parliamentary sovereignty. No court can declare any
of the provisions that I have described unconstitutional. Many
years ago a South African judge of appeal said that it was the duty
of the courts to act as buttresses between the executive and the
subject. 45 But how are they to do so in the light of their duty to
give effect to parliamentary enactments however draconian and
however "offensive to conventional legal standards"? The answer
ordinarily given is that their sole power is the power to interpret
those enactments. In the judgment previously quoted, the judge
put this in clear language:
Our Courts are constitutionally powerless to legislate or
to veto legislation. They can only interpret it, and then
implement it in accordance with their interpretation of it.
When there is a real doubt about the meaning of a statute,
their tradition is to construe it so that it provides for the
least amount of interference with the liberty of the individual that is compatible with the language used. The
tradition has been observed for so long, and has permeated
so many fields of our law,46 that it is unnecessary to cite
authority for its acceptance.
So this too is axiomatic.
No doubt the question will be asked: how have the South
African courts performed this function of strict interpretation in
favorem libertatis in the field of the security and procedural legislation with which I have been dealing? In my-I hope sufficientlyrespectful opinion, their performance has been mixed. If I were
to mark them by the Oxford method, I would give them a beta,
query beta minus. On the positive side, there has been some
attempt to give a restrictive interpretation to those provisions of
the Terrorism Act that place the burden of proof on the accused
and to ensure that the procedural advantages of the prosecution
are not improperly extended. This is at least true of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court, which has set aside on appeal
several verdicts given by trial judges for want of sufficiently con451Rex v. Pretoria Timber Co. (Pty), [1950] 3 S.A. 163, 182 (App. Div.)
(opinion of van den Heever, J.A.).
46
Nxasana v. Minister of Justice, [1976] 3 S.A. 745, 747 (Durban & Coast
Local Div.) (per Didcott, J.).
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vincing evidence of guilt. In upholding these appeals, it has even
reversed the trial judge's findings on the credibility of witnesses. 47
Further, although section 6 (5) of the Terrorism Act states that no
court shall pronounce on the validity of any action taken under
section 6 or order the release of any detainee, this section does not
preclude the court from enquiring into the lawfulness of the
treatment that a detainee receives in detention.4 The court will
therefore on suitable evidence enjoin the police from using unlawful
49
methods of interrogation.
On the negative side, however, the courts have shown a marked
reluctance to permit evidence of ill-treatment to be given by the
person most concerned, namely the detainee himself. In 1964 a
case came to the courts under another "security" statute which,
like section 6 of the Terrorism Act, provided for detention without
access to lawyer or friend for the purposes of interrogation. 50 The
wife of a detainee had received a smuggled note from him saying
that relays of policemen had interrogated him for twenty-eight
hours on end without allowing him to rest or even to sit down.
When he fell to the floor out of exhaustion, the police threw cold
water over him and dragged him to his feet. The wife applied
urgently for an injunction restraining the police from continuing
this method of interrogation. The police made affidavits denying
the allegations, and the wife's counsel asked the court to order that
the husband be brought to court to give evidence himself. This
was refused by the judge, and his refusal was upheld by a majority
in the Appellate Division.51 The ground of refusal was that to
have the detainee brought to court would interfere with the object
of the statute-continuous detention, in isolation, for the purposes
of interrogation. Whether this was an inevitable conclusion, having due regard for the terms of the statute, may be judged in the
47See, e.g., State v. Mdingi, [1979] 1 S.A. 309, 317 (App. Div.); State v.
Essack, [1974] 1 S.A. 1, 16-17, 20-21 (App. Div.); State v. ffrench-Beytagh, [1972]
3 S.A. 430, 446 (App. Div.). See also State v. Mushimba, [1977] 2 S.A. 829 (App.
Div.), in which the Appellate Division set aside a conviction under the Terrorism
Act on the ground that the security police had unlawfully obtained material from
the defence files through an agent in the defence attorney's office.
48

Nxasana v. Minister of Justice, [1976] 3 S.A. 745, 748 (Durban & Coast
Local Div.) (per Didcott, J.).
49
Essop v. Commissioner of South African Police, [1972] 1 Prentice Hall
Reports, H. 4 (Transvaal Provincial Div.).
50 General Law Amendment Act, No. 37 of 1963, § 17.
51 Schermbrucker v. Klindt, N.O., [1965] 4 S.A. 606 (App. Div.), aff'g [1965]
1 S.A. 353 (Transvaal Provincial Div.). See Dugard, The Courts and Section 6 of
the Terrorism Act, 87 S. AFm. L.J. 289 (1970).
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light of the fact that two judges of appeal, including the present
Chief Justice, 52 wrote powerful dissents.
In a later case the fathers of some young men detained under
section 6 of the Terrorism Act applied to the Transvaal court for
an injunction to restrain the police from assaulting the detainees
during their interrogation. Because of the earlier case, the applicants asked not that the detainees be brought to court but merely
that affidavits be taken from them by a government official. The
court held that the Act prevented any such affidavit's being placed
before it. 5 In other cases also the requirements of the interrogators
would seem to have been placed above those of the detainee. It is
enough to mention just one more-a much-criticised opinion of
the full bench of the Eastern Cape court in which that court held
that the threat of further detention did not make the detainee's
confession anything but freely or voluntarily made, and thus
54
admissible against him.
These cases give some indication of the judicial approach to
the Terrorism Act and to similar statutes. They show judges about
their ordinary business of interpreting statutes, evaluating evidence,
and reaching varying conclusions. But, it may be asked, what do
they feel about these forms of procedure, and especially about
indefinite pretrial detention incommunicado, which have so distorted the traditional legal standards they were trained to follow?
One may of course ask the same question about the many statutes
embodying racial discrimination which the judges are compelled
to apply, whatever the hardship those statutes cause. The answer
is that on the whole the judges do not say. No doubt some of them
regard this legislation as justifiable and proper. Others do not
and occasionally hint as much. Some judges who have to enforce
these laws emphasise that they are bound by Parliament's law and
have no option but to apply it. For example, in a recent case a
judge upheld the conviction of an Indian man for unlawfully
renting an apartment in a "white" area, and ordered his ejectment
although the evidence showed that no habitable accommodation
52

Mr. Justice Frans L. Rumpff.

53 Cooper v. Minister of Police, [1977] 2 S.A. 209 (Transvaal Provincial Div.)
(per Trengove, J.). This case was decided in 1974, but not reported until 1977.
More recently, a Natal judge has refused to follow this decision. Nxasana v.
Minister of Justice, [1976] 3 S.A. 745, 753-55 (Durban & Coast Local Div.) (per

Didcott, J.).
54
State v. Ilekani, [19641 4 S.A. 429, 439-40 (Eastern Cape Div.) (decided
under General Law Amendment Act, No. 37 of 1963, § 17). The correctness of
this decision was left open in State v. Alexander, [1965] 2 S.A. 796, 814 (App.
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was available to him and his family in the "Indian" area of his city.
In giving judgment the judge said:
An Act of Parliament creates law but not necessarily
equity. As a judge in a court of law I am obliged to give
effect to the provisions of an Act of Parliament. Speaking
for myself, and if I were sitting as a court of equity, I would
have come to the assistance of the appellant. Unfortunately, and on an intellectually honest approach, I am
compelled to conclude that the appeal must fail. 5
This passage echoes the statement of the great dissenter in
Dred Scott v. Sanford,5 6 Mr. Justice McLean. A lifelong opponent
of slavery, Justice McLean excused or explained his enforcement
of the fugitive slave laws as follows: "With the abstract principles
of slavery, courts called to administer this law have nothing to
do." 57 "[T]he hardship and injustice supposed arises out of the
institution of slavery, over which we have no control. Under
such circumstances, we can not be held answerable." 5s
This reasoning did not go unscathed in the United States, nor
has it, entirely, in South Africa. In 1971 a Durban law professor
asked, in a public address, whether the time had not come for
judges to stand up in defence of the rule of law and to say something about an institution, the Terrorism Act, "'which they must
surely know to be an abdication [sic] of decency and justice.' "59
In particular, he suggested, the judiciary could make the Act less
useful to the authorities "'by denying, on account of the built-in
intimidatory effect of unsupervised solitary confinement, practically all creditworthiness to evidence procured under those detention provisions.' "'0 At that time, as the professor knew, a trial
under the Terrorism Act was in progress in which allegations had
been made that the police had intimidated state witnesses while in
detention. The melancholy result, for the professor, was that he
was prosecuted on a charge of attempting to obstruct justice. The
prosecution's theory was that he was exhorting the judge to disregard admissible evidence and thus to act improperly. On this
55 State v. Adams (Transvaal Provincial Div. Sept., 1979) (unreported).
56 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting).
57 Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 339 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583).
58 Id. 340.
59
Address by Professor Barend van Niekerk at Durban City Hall (Nov. 9,
1971), quoted in State v. van Niekerk, [1972] 3 S.A. 711, 716 (App. Div.). For
a discussion of this case, see Dugard, Judges, Academics and Uniust Laws: The Van

Niekerk Contempt Case, 89 S. Ar. LJ. 271 (1972).

60 State v. van Niekerk, [1972] 3 S.A. 711, 716-17 (App. Div.).
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theory, the professor was prosecuted and convicted. 61 The judge
who tried his case said that "'in a society such as ours' " 62 it was
not for judges to take sides in public controversies. Nevertheless,
he said, this did not mean that a judge must acquiesce in legislation of a really monstrous kind; his way out would then be to
3
resign
I know of no South African judge who has in fact found any
law so monstrous as to compel him to resign." I do not say this
as a criticism of individual judges, least of all as a criticism of those
whose minds are troubled by the laws that they have to apply.
After all, Justices Story and McLean did not feel called upon to
resign from the bench rather than enforce the fugitive slave laws. 5
And one is grateful for those judges who have done what they can
to mitigate the harshness of the South African system. The only
generalization in which I shall indulge is that if one participates
in a system that distorts justice, truisms about the limited functions
of a judge will not necessarily save one's soul.
What of the bar? What do they do when they get into court,
under the heavily loaded rules of the Terrorism Act? The answer
is: the best they can. Lawyers tend to play by the rules of the
game; when the rules change, they try to win under the new rules.
Indeed, one forgets occasionally that it is a different game. The
court looks the same, witnesses are examined and cross-examined,
lawyers address the court and cite authority. But the realities
break through. A fifteen-year-old boy is called as a state witness.
It turns out that he has been in solitary detention for three months
before being brought to court. Or the accused are acquitted and
discharged by the court, but when they leave the courtroom they
are immediately re-arrested and detained. 6 What has the exercise
in court been worth?
61 Id. 711.

62 State v. van Niekerk (Durban & Coast Local Div. Dec. 13, 1971) (unreported) (per Fannin, J.), quoted in Dugard, supra note 59, at 283.
63 Id.
64

Sir Robert Tredgold, then Chief Justice of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, resigned in 1960 in protest against the Southern Rhodesian Law and
Order Maintenance Act, No. 53 of 1960. He felt that it "would compel the Courts
to become party to widespread injustice." R. TREDoMD, THE RHODEsTA THAT WAs
My Lir 232 (1968). Whether the provisions of that Act go beyond those of the
corresponding South African statutes is a nice point.
65 See R. Covmn, JusTicE AccusEm (1975), especially chapters 7 & 13.
66 Cf. J. DucAxm, supra note 14, at 216 (describing the re-arrest of Mrs.
Winnie Mandela and 21 other accused in Pretoria in February, 1970, immediately
after their acquittal under the Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950).

620

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. M2:603

In this regard South African lawyers, including those who defend in political cases, have, like judges, had to face a fundamental
attack on the part they play in the South African system. Mr. Joel
Carlson, a South African attorney, who over many years had given
service to his clients in political trials in South Africa, eventually
went into exile. He considered that his work as a defence lawyer
"was assisting the regime to present an overall image, at home and
overseas, of judicial integrity and a fair legal system." 67 Others
have echoed this view. The question raised, of course, does not
apply only to lawyers. What is anyone's duty in a society that he
believes to be unjust and that he does not believe can be changed
by any effort of his? In The First Circle Solzhenitsyn has a character say: "What is the most precious thing in the world? It seems
to be the consciousness of not participating in injustice. Injustice
is stronger than you are, it always was and it always will be; but let
it not be committed through you." 68
P.W. Botha's South Africa is not by any means Stalin's Russia,
but even so this austere imperative is not easy to live by. For
judges it may be impossible, and, if Mr. Carlson is right, perhaps
for practising lawyers too. Possibly our participation in the distorted legal process I have described does give it some respectability.
I hope this is not so, but if so, what is the alternative? Must one
refuse to take any part in these trials? A mere practising advocate
cannot very satisfactorily explore the ethical and social ramifications
of this question, much less offer a generally satisfactory solution.
He must fall back on the traditional ethics of his profession, not to
answer the question but to evade it.
The answer is one that more appropriately comes from his
clients. For the most part the attitude of defendants in South
African political trials has been that they wish to be defendedto be acquitted if possible, and, if not, at least to get the minimum
sentence. There have been cases, however, in which the defendants
have refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the court. These, so
far, have been exceptional. This may change. A recent and disquieting tendency in South African political trials has been to exclude the public (although not the press) from the court and to
forbid the press from publishing the names of state witnesses. The
ground given for these rulings is the fear that those witnesses will
be harmed or even killed by the political associates of the accused.
In the most recent of the major political trials, in Pietermaritzburg
67 J.

CA.LSON, No NEuTRAL GRouND 362 (1973).

68 A. SoLzHENmTSXN, Tim

FnsT CmcLE ch. 55, at 418 (Fontana ed. 1970).
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last September, when the judge ordered the public to be excluded
from the court, all the defendants dismissed their counsel and refused to take any further part in the proceedings. This attitude may
become more common. But as long as defendants want the services
of an advocate, he is not to refuse them. And if it be said that by
so doing he is bolstering up an unjust system, that is one more
burden of an onerous profession.
By way of summing up, I limit myself to two propositions.
One is obvious-in the absence of an entrenched bill of rights, the
judiciary is a poor bulwark against a determined and immoderate
government. The other is not so obvious, at least in South Africa.
It is that legislation such as I have described does more than restrict
judges' legal power to protect the liberties of the subject: it increasingly undermines their will to do so, even when it may still
be possible. Too soon they accept a position of subordination and
unprotesting powerlessness. And this has a reciprocal effect. Judge
Learned Hand once said, "[a] society whose judges have taught it to
expect complaisance will exact complaisance." 69
That is the great loss. One day there will be change in South
Africa. Those who then come to rule may have seen the process of
law in their country not as protection against power but as no more
than its convenient instrument, to be manipulated at will. It would
then not be surprising if they failed to appreciate the value of an
independent judiciary and of due process of law. If so, then it may
be said of those who now govern that they destroyed better than
they knew.
Is there any hope of restoring what has been lost? It would
not be realistic to say so. But realism, however sombre, is not to
be confused with silence or acquiescence. "It is not necessary to
hope in order to work, and it is not necessary to succeed in order to
persevere." 70
69 L. HAND, The Contribution of an Independent judiciary to Civilization, in
Tm SPmrr OF LIBmTY 163 (3d ed. 1960).
70 Attributed to William of Orange (1533-1584).

